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Health Care: Public Good
or Private Enterprise?
David M. Lawrence
Introduction
I start with the premise that the success of our efforts in health care is best measured by
our ability to impact the health status of our citizens in the most affordable way possible.
This brief provides an overview of the history of organized health care systems, then
discusses several of the conundrums that are posed by knowledge of that history.
But before I do that, I’d like to set the stage by summarizing the kinds of things that are
going on in health care now.
The Health Care Market of the 1990s
The state of health care in the 1990s can best be summarized by a series of projections
produced by Deloitte & Touche a few years ago.
According to those projections, half the hospital beds in the United States will be closed by
the end of the decade.
In addition, based on the experienced of well-organized, well-integrated health care
systems, there are probably 100,000 to 125,000 excess physicians in the United States.
Many of those physicians are trained in the wrong specialties, creating not only an excess of
gross supply but also an excess supply of subspecialists, and a real imbalance between the
specialty and primary care activities in medical care.
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Beyond the excess capacity, there is explosive growth in the for-profit sector in health care.
The best example of this is Columbia HCA, which started as a hospital care organization,
but is now moving into integrated care. Five or six years ago, Columbia was just a small bit
player. Now it has become the largest health care organization in the country, with
approximately $17 billion in annual revenues, owning and running 350 to 400 hospitals
across the United States. 
Alternatively, look at the rapid growth of United Health Care, which I would describe as a
managed contracting or managed discounting organization, rather than a managed care
organization. But if one looks at their price-earnings multiples or their recent acquisition of
the large insurance capability that jumped their membership from about 2 to 12 million
people whose lives they cover, one begins to get a sense of the degree to which health plans,
insurance, and health care organization and delivery are being influenced by the explosion
in for-profit care.
If one looks at places like Portland, Oregon, one sees the impact of this change in the
organization of the health care delivery system. In 1994, we studied what was happening to
that marketplace, because we have a long-standing plan there. About one in five people in
Portland receive their care through our system. For years and years, our competitor was
Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Oregon. 
The market began to change in the late 1980s. We projected that within 18 months
Portland would shift from 80 percent fee-for-service and 20 percent with Kaiser
Permanente to a situation in which about 85 to 90 percent of the population of Portland
would be cared for in one of three plans, all of them managed care plans. It converted
almost overnight! And it was only one example.
Even as we considered public policy-driven health care reform at the national and state
levels, there was a revolution occurring underneath the surface, driven by market forces,
which has radically transformed the health care industry. What’s interesting about this
transformation is that it is just the beginning; the real fun is about to occur. What’s been
going on in the health sector over the last four to five years has been a shift from an
industry that was highly fragmented to one that now has in place the elements for an
economic marketplace to begin to play itself out. 
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Here are some of the elements of that change: 
Purchasing Coalitions. Until about 1988 or 1989, most purchasers— by which I mean
large employers— simply paid the bill. But with intense international competition and
the cost of health care continuing to skyrocket, it simply became too big a cost to ignore.
Purchasers began to band together into purchasing coalitions to try very aggressive
alternative ways of buying health care. For example, Xerox and GTE began putting
enormous pressure on the health care system. That had never happened before.
Health Care Surplus. There was a tremendous discontinuity in the health care
marketplace, in that the supply was far in excess of demand. That provides an
opportunity for people who are willing to take advantage of it to come in and redress the
supply-demand imbalance. While other opportunities for capital investment had
somewhat dwindled, the excitement of the health care stocks attracted a great deal of
Wall Street money, following entrepreneurs like Rick Scott and others who entered
health care for the purpose of taking advantage of the imbalance in supply and demand.
Health Care Provider Coalitions. It’s been fascinating to watch the emergence in a
relatively short period of time of fairly powerful medical group-hospital combinations, in
part to bring together what we’ve learned about managed care, and in part to protect
themselves from the leverage that insurers and health plans have been able to gain by
aggregating populations that they cover. In other words, if I as a health plan have
control over 1 or 2 million lives, I can deliver those patients to a group of physicians and
a hospital and gain tremendous leverage in the contracting. Obviously, that is a natural
process when there is too much supply. 
What has happened is that many physician groups have begun to come together with
hospitals, or independently, to create their own counterbalance to that leverage on the part
of the purchasers, or on the part of the financiers of care.
We have all of these elements in play. There are a number of very troubling issues that this
particular period in health care in the United States poses for us.
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Impetus for Organized Health Care in the United States
Emily Friedman, who is a writer, ethicist, and medical historian, gave a lecture on the
history of organized health care systems at the American Hospital Association’s annual
convention.  She was asked by the Minnesota Hospital Association (now the Minnesota1
Hospital and Health Care Partnership) to do a history of health care in Minnesota, and it’s
on this basis that she developed these observations. This was in addition to some work she
did in 1994 on the early history of capitation and health systems.
In her Minnesota work, she started to ask, “What about the organized systems? What
about the Mayos, the Health Partners, and other organizations like that? How did they
start?” Interestingly, she found that these systems originated in three distinct streams or
sets of activities. The first, especially in the north-central and northwestern parts of the
United States, was an outgrowth, she believes, of the cooperative movement that Swedish,
Norwegian, and Finnish immigrants brought to the United States. Its roots were in the
collectivism, or the cooperative movement, of Northern Europe. When one looks at the
development of Group Health Cooperative of Puget Sound just before World War II or at
the antecedents to Health Partners in Minnesota, one sees how that the cooperative
movement has played through the organization of these kinds of systems.
The second major force that drove the development of these systems was employers. We are
the beneficiary, for example, of Henry Kaiser, who needed to provide health care to his
workers building Grand Coulee Dam, before World War II, and later needed to provide
health care to his workers during World War II, when he was building ships. It was a
leader, an entrepreneur like Henry Kaiser, who really gave the impetus for the
development of our kind of organization.
Third, there was an impetus that came from providers themselves, as they sought a better
alternative to care than the one that they were experiencing in traditional fee-for-service
medicine.
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The first formal prepaid “health care plan” may have been La Société Française de
Bienfaisance Mutuelle in San Francisco. This cooperative was founded in 1849 by French
immigrants to San Francisco who paid a nickel a member a month, hired physicians, and
eventually built the French Hospital to provide care to their enrollees. If one looks at the
origins of the Mayo Clinic, with its emphasis on salaried physicians, professional
cooperation, and the public good through the Mayo foundation, one sees some of the same
roots moving through that history.
The first example of a fully integrated system was in Oklahoma. A Syrian immigrant
named Michael Shadid reacted to an experience he had with a colleague. A fee-for-service
surgeon who needed money performed three unnecessary surgeries on three patients in one
night and all three died. Michael Shadid was apparently so incensed that he began to
search for an alternative way to organize care. He organized the first real cooperative of its
sort in the United States as an integrated, prepaid health care system in Elk City,
Oklahoma. The Cooperative Hospital of Elk City is now Great Plains Regional Medical
Center; it converted from cooperative status in 1965.
Right after World War II, what we now know as Kaiser Permanente, Group Health
Cooperative of Puget Sound, Health Partners, and others began to emerge as forces in
American medicine. The Harvard Community Health Plan also later emerged.
Characteristics of Managed Health Care Systems
Prepayment. You receive a lump sum at the beginning of a period of time and in
response, you provide the care for the population. It’s now called capitation. It had its
roots in the 1850s. 
Defined Population. You deal with an enrolled population. You know the patients or the
population from which you’re going to draw your patient base, and for which you
assume responsibility. 
Alignment of Incentives. There is an alignment of incentives among physicians and the
health plan. The incentives are directed at taking care of that population in the most
effective and efficient way possible.
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Physician Management of Clinical Care. In contrast to what is emerging in managed
contracting, managed discounting, and insurance kinds of organizations, in these
original integrated systems the physicians were responsible for clinical decision making,
for determining how patients were going to be cared for individually and collectively. In
many of them, physicians worked together with business people to set the policies and
the directions for the organization itself. That stands in stark contrast to many of the
managed care kinds of organizations currently, in which the insurance company or the
health plan is involved in making clinical decisions by putting limits on benefits or on
the way things are done. The worst manifestation of this is the “1-800-no you can’t”
number.
Clinical Integration. That is, trying to bring together in the most efficient way possible
the elements of care in order to deal with an individual patient or a collection of
patients. 
Not-for-Profit Status. Almost all were organized as public benefit organizations,
corporations, that is 501(c)(3) or not-for-profit organizations, whose purpose was to
serve the public. Profits were used to improve the system of care, the equipment, the
facilities, the benefits, or returned to the members, by law, in the form of lower
premiums.
Voluntary Membership. Another key characteristic of most of these organizations that
emerged after World War II was the importance of dual choice. That is, people should
not be forced into an integrated health care system but rather should have a choice.
That’s been a principle that’s driven this particular segment of the industry for almost
50 years.
The last thing that Emily Friedman observed, which is important as we look forward, is
that in the competition between traditional fee-for-service medicine and prepaid integrated
systems, the integrated systems have won. New forms of care management beyond the
alternative fee-for-service independent doctor or freestanding hospital system are now
being invented. 
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The Lessons and Future of Managed Care
About 70 percent of people in the United States now receive their care in some form of
managed contracting, managed discounting, or managed care organization. A noted Wall
Street analyst predicts that by the end of the decade there will be a very small residual of
traditional fee-for-service medicine and that the rest of the country will be receiving its care
through some form of managed care organization.
What are the lessons we can draw from the integrated care systems that have been in
existence for 50 years or more?
Quality. Quality is where this question of the impact on health and health status comes to
the fore. We have very limited tools by which to measure health care quality. We can look
at training, board certification, JCHO accreditation, and more forms of structural quality.
We can look at the processes by which care is assessed through quality assurance systems,
which is what JCHO does, and now the National Committee on Quality Assurance
(NCQA). But in general we don’t have terrific ways to measure quality. Nonetheless, there
is a reasonable collection of data that suggests that in the fully integrated care systems, like
Harvard, Group Health Cooperative, and Kaiser Permanente, care is superior.
First of all, there are the external assessments in the 30 plus hospitals that we, the Group
Health Cooperative, or Harvard own. Our hospitals tend to be very highly rated in the
accreditation process, often with commendation. The recent NCQA reviews of managed
care organizations have resulted in almost all fully integrated systems receiving the full
accreditation and it’s a fairly tough accreditation hurdle in its current form. Research by
independent bodies also corroborates the notion that there is some link between the
integrated prepaid practice systems of the sort that I’ve mentioned and quality. For
example, in California, for the last decade a survey called the Williams Study has been done
every two or three years; it looks at the outcomes for low birth weight babies, corrected by
what we understand to be risk factors. Our hospitals have been in the top quartile of those
studies in each of the last three surveys. In another independent study on cardiovascular
surgery morbidity and mortality, our hospitals in San Francisco and Los Angeles always
end up in the top quartile. Studies like these are beginning to provide evidence about the
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relationship between integration of care, alignment of incentives, physician management,
and quality. 
Measuring Quality. Technology assessment suggests that somewhere in the range of 15 to 20
percent of health care that’s practiced in the United States is based on sound population-
based studies, that is, knowing what is going to work for what populations under which
circumstances. The rest is based on outstanding biomolecular research, habit, and where
you happen to have been trained. We have a long way to go to establish the basis, with
sound population-based research, for understanding outcomes in health care. We also
know that the health care that’s practiced across the country is enormously variable. I
think the numbers are at a 300 plus percent variation in the use of diagnostic and
treatment aids from one community to another across the country, with no appreciable
difference in the outcomes. We also know from recent studies by the Harvard School of
Public Health, for example, in the hospitals of New York, about the problems of medical
misadventures in hospitals. It’s called “the silent epidemic.” Our systems for quality control
in the United States are very primitive. The measurement systems are getting better, but
it’s going to be some time before we have the kind of data that will allow us to determine
what works for which populations under what circumstances across the spectrum of care
that we’re now providing.
Because of this lack of science and this variability the greatest opportunities for managing
costs in health care come from improving quality. As the quality goes up, the costs go
down. There is so much variation in practice patterns across the country and so little
integration or organization of care to support appropriate care patterns that there is
enormous waste in the system related to that alone. It isn’t about fraud. It isn’t about
profit maximizing. It’s that we are still not well grounded in our science.
I think another piece of evidence has to do with contributions to the medical care standards
in the country. The current information that we operate on concerning colorectal cancer or
breast cancer screening, proper immunization of children, or the care of women who had a
prior Cesarean section and the possibility of having subsequent babies by normal vaginal
delivery, and the major population-based science that has been established around these
questions has come primarily from fully integrated health care systems like Group Health
Cooperative, Harvard, and Kaiser Permanente.
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Work on the social HMO, which looks at ways to link together medical care with other
social support systems under Medicare, has also been spearheaded in these kinds of
organizations. The original work that looked at what would happen if we mainstreamed
people who were covered under medically indigent programs like Medicaid also occurred in
these kinds of programs, signifying significant contributions to the way in which we could
provide care to the poor.
Teaching Mission. One of the top producers of primary care physicians in the country is
Kaiser Permanente, and when it’s coupled together with Group Health Cooperative of
Puget Sound, and Harvard and Health Partners, we have a tremendous impact on training
primary care physicians for the country.
There is a link between these fully integrated, aligned systems and quality to the extent we
can measure quality.
Incentives. We are learning from experience with managed discounters and managed care
organizations that incentives matter in health care. As physicians, we are constrained by
professional ethics. Because of the lack of clear-cut definition of what is appropriate care,
the opportunities for us to make decisions at the margins, of either doing too much or too
little, are substantial. We have continued to experiment with our kinds of systems, trying to
find the right balance of incentives that reward physicians and other health professionals
for taking care of enrolled populations— to pay them for winning.
If one looks at the way the Mayo Clinic, the Cleveland Clinic, Virginia Mason, or Group
Health Cooperative and Harvard Community Health Plan and other organizations like
ours operate, one sees a focus on salaried physicians with bonuses that are dependent on
how well the organization as a whole does, and how well the organization meets its social
goals of improving health or improving satisfaction. That seems to be a very powerful way
to organize the incentives for physicians.
For-Profit versus Not-for-Profit Status. The board’s responsibility in a for-profit company is
to maximize return for shareholders. Management is typically paid on the basis of how they
have managed return for shareholders. In not-for-profit health care organizations, for
example, in my situation, I don’t get any more money for maximizing profit, for exceeding
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what we need to invest in the well-being of the institution. Any increase in my bonus comes
from what happens to health status and satisfaction and member growth. That is the
difference between the for-profit and not-for-profit incentives. There’s a real question
about what happens under pressure, when margins are squeezed and the incentives are to
maximize shareholder return or to provide public benefit.
Integration of Care. I’ve discussed care integration under the rubric of quality. Now I want
to focus specifically on the integration of care. When we think about traditional health care
in the United States, we think about a very fragmented system with individual doctors or
small group practices that take care of a certain segment of the illness or the patient. When
one thinks about providing care that way, and lay that up against the complexity of the
diseases that we face now in the late 20th century, especially the impact of chronic disease
on our population, one begins to understand that that method of organization may not be
up to the task. When you can array and align educational activities, home health activities,
hospice activities, hospital care, nursing care, and physician care, and you can build the
systems that meet the needs of those with serious illnesses, then you understand the power
of integration to provide superior care.
Let me give you a simple example— the breast cancer screening program and early
detection program of Group Health Cooperative of Puget Sound. Now normally when we
think about breast cancer screening and early detection we think about having a good
mammography program. That’s just one adjunct, one modality for screening. When you
have an enrolled population, you can segment the population by risk factors, and you can
intercede with different elements of the population based on their risks. You can have an
intensive program of education, self-breast exam, and mammography screening for women
with a family history of breast cancer. You can have a very different kind of program for
the women under 40 who have none of the risk factors. In addition to the education and
screening program, you can also set up a program for quick diagnosis and intervention
when suspicious lumps are found. In an integrated system, you can set up support and
educational programs for patients who’ve just been discovered with cancer. You can set it
up all the way down through the system for a population such that, as in Group Health
Cooperative of Puget Sound, the find rates are very high, the staging is early in the course
of disease, and the savings in human life are significant. That’s the value of an integrated
system.
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Financing Health Care. Disease is fundamentally a random walk. Who it occurs in, when,
and in what form is largely unpredictable. We’ve learned to assess risk factors so we can
increase our understanding of the probability that disease may develop, but with some
notable exceptions most disease occurs relatively randomly. It is a function of luck and your
parents. Now what does that imply in terms of health insurance? What it suggests is that
the way you would most effectively deal with a random event, that has enormous
consequences in terms of cost, would be to spread the risks over large populations. The
broader the population, the more the impacts of disease are dampened for the individual.
We’ve learned over the last 40 or 50 years that the push for broader benefits came from our
physicians. As we identified things that needed to be covered in order to take care of
patients, our benefit packages expanded. It was not market driven, it was not employers or
labor unions asking for the moon. It had to do with quality of care. What we’ve seen as
we’ve tried to respond to the marketplace in the last few years is, as you reduce benefits
you get real changes in the health-care seeking behavior of members. Relatively quickly you
begin to get aberrant health-seeking patterns, such as putting off care. As a consequence,
disease is intercepted later, not earlier. Prevention services, even secondary prevention
services, often are foregone, and we end up with a more expensive kind of health care. It
certainly is poorer quality when care is avoided in that form.
Consumer Expectations. The next observation has to do with consumer attitudes. American
consumers have a love affair with new technologies— with all of the latest things that can
keep us from getting older and dying.
A second element that involves consumers in the United States is that choice, whether real
or illusory, is a critical aspect in driving public policy decisions of a wide array of stripes.
It’s particularly true in health care. 
For 50 or 75 years we’ve been trained to think that more care is better care and that the
higher tech the place is that you go for care, the better the quality. It’s deeply rooted in the
American psyche that more is better. Whereas, we at Kaiser Permanente believe that the
best care is the care that works. It is a constant educational process to wean people away
from their love affair with technology and talk instead about appropriate care.
Unfortunately, the general belief is that when you’re talking in those terms you’re rationing
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or withholding care. And it poses a real dilemma as we move into the managed care era in
American medicine.
Issues for Further Study
The fundamental question that I think we need to address is, can the for-profit health plans
advocate appropriately on behalf of their patients and members when faced with the
margin squeeze and the need to meet the expectations of shareholders, who are the primary
focus and responsibility of the boards of directors of those companies?
Most of health care and the health sector is for-profit. However, most hospitals in the
United States are still not-for-profit. The use of hospitals is dropping. At least two studies
suggest that half the hospital beds in the United States will be closed by the end of the
decade. We’re finding more ways of taking care of patients in ambulatory and non-hospital
settings, as are many people across the country. The real issue with this for-profit/not-for-
profit question is in the health plans, the managed care organizations. It is fascinating and
distressing that in many parts of the United States, including the State of California, the
conversion of not-for-profit to for-profit health plan enterprises has taken place with
virtually no public debate. In contrast, in the 1980s a law was passed in Minnesota that
basically forbade the creation of for-profit health plans. Efforts are now underway to
overturn that law. The rapid growth in managed care is occurring in the for-profit sector,
and it raises some very interesting questions for us in terms of public policy.
Fundamentally, the dilemma is one in which we are pitting the investor-owner-shareholder
health care juggernaut against history, evidence, and a generally underperforming and
undercapitalized not-for-profit sector.
There is no historical precedent, that I’m aware of, in any sector of the economy in which
there is a battle going on between not-for-profit and for-profit institutions. But if history is
any guide, the juggernaut certainly has the upper hand.
The real question that will play itself out over the next five to seven years is, can those
plans, those organizations that are focusing on managed contracting, convert to focusing on
managed care?
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I’ve used terms like managed contracting, managed discounting, and managed care to
describe different kinds of approaches. Those are the choices in health care right now.
Managed contracting is a form of financing, usually an insurance company or a so-called
managed care organization that’s been a conversion from, typically, an insurance base.
Many of the Blues conversions have done this— accreting lives and members, then
contracting with outside providers for the care. The game is to get leverage, either the
financing system on the providers, or in contrast, as the providers try to organize, the
providers on the financing system. That’s a contracting game— trying to obtain cost
containment through contracting concessions.
Managed discounting is fundamentally the same idea. I’ve got enough members to have
leverage over you. I’ll pay your marginal costs in Hospital X, Y, or Z, or I’ll pay you,
Physician X, Y, or Z, a capitation rate of this. Take it or leave it! If you leave it, I’m
walking away with a good number of your patients, who now are in my plan. That’s a
strategy that will work as long as there’s a significant imbalance in the supply and demand.
The real opportunities for improving impacts in health care and cost performance lie in
improving quality. To do that requires that care is integrated and that we know what can
have the most significant impact on the health of enrolled populations. To do this will
require large investments in information systems; major efforts to develop protocols and
guidelines for physicians; massive physician incentives; and ownership incentives. This will
be a very fundamental battle in health care, as we watch to see whether or not that
conversion takes place.
The third major dilemma that we face is the insurance question. The more risk is spread,
the more equitable it is because of the random nature of illness. Comprehensive benefits,
properly designed, are the way to deal with the issue of quality and impact. Yet look at
what’s happening in the industry. The industry is taking a number of steps to fragment
risk pools in order to avoid risk. Benefit structures are condensing. Employers are moving
to far more flexibility in benefit design— reducing benefits, increasing co-pays, increasing
deductibles, and cutting back on unnecessary benefits, from their point of view. At the
same time that we have a body of evidence suggesting that comprehensive care and
comprehensive social insurance may work to the advantage of a population, we’re seeing
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forces in the marketplace that are moving in the other direction. For many who are in the
marketplace, products and the insurance game is the way in which they are competing.
Interestingly, when we look at what is happening in Washington, we see some of the same
thinking. The medical savings account is being driven by a fundamental belief in offering
choice to people. It means that the wealthy and healthy are going to have access to
catastrophic health insurance in a savings account. The ill will then have to continue
getting their care through regular insurance. Guess what that does to the price of regular
insurance? Guess where the people who have chosen the medical savings account go when
they get ill? They convert. It seems somewhat misguided.
A major conundrum for our country is that as risk pools are fragmented, benefit packages
reduced, and employers become more draconian in the way in which they offer insurance
to their employees, we continue to see a rise in the uninsured and the underinsured. People
get care. It is where they get care, and at what cost, that is the problem. It’s a penny wise-
pound foolish kind of shortsightedness with which we have yet to come to grips.
The next major issue for us to consider comes out of our understanding of consumer
attitudes. There is a significant anti-managed care bias reaction underway now. It began in
1994 and is accelerating at the national level. We have seen it in more aggressive ways in
several states, beginning in 1992 and 1993. Consumers who believe more is better are
frightened to death about managed care. Consumer advocacy organizations have been
working overtime to try to create consumer awareness and protection around managed
care. Physicians and hospitals that are trained in, and acculturated to, the traditional
models of fee-for-service medicine are seeing the end of that particular way of doing
practice. Their organizations, in many instances, are putting up a very strong fight against
this shift to managed care. The American Medical Association has introduced the Patient
Protection Act, which many of us believe is a Physician Protection Act, that seeks to
preserve the status quo in medicine. Joined with consumer fears, it is fanning the anti-
managed care flames.
There are also some pretty bad managed care organizations that create their own horror
stories and their own self-fulfilling prophecy. In spite of the fact that over 70 percent of the
population is now in some form of managed care, there is great uneasiness about this. It
remains unclear as to when, if at all, that uneasiness will dissipate. Will we be able to deal
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with creating an appropriate framework within which the managed care organizations
should operate? This must define acceptable practices and protect consumers from the
worst abuses of those systems in terms of incentives to withhold, avoid, or ration care.
What are we going to leave to our children? Research dollars are certainly being
constrained. There is an open question as to whether or not the biomedical industry will
continue to flood research with substantial dollars to offset the loss of federal funds. It is
both at the biomolecular level, as well as at the population-based science development level,
that we need continued evolution of our science and health care to push the frontiers in
disease management. But we are in a very telling time. What will the managed care
organizations’ contribution be to research? What is the incentive to make investments in
research and development and to share those findings in the public domain, rather than
keeping them as a quasi-patent for shareholder gain?
Another question involves teaching. The academic health care institutions are in deep
trouble around the country. There are serious questions about the teaching mission. Most
academic hospitals are struggling to keep their heads above water— and few are
succeeding. Who’s going to do the teaching? What kinds of professionals need to be taught
and where are they going to be taught? Again, if we have a managed care delivery system,
what is the commitment, what is the responsibility of those managed care organizations to
continue the teaching mission so essential to providing well-trained professionals for the
generations that follow us?
Conclusion
Let me summarize. I’ve tried to provide a point of view from the trenches about what
we’ve learned from 140 years of history with integrated systems, what we’ve learned about
how to have an impact on health and health status in a way that’s affordable and socially
responsible. I’ve tried to draw from those experiences and those lessons some insight into
the dilemmas we face, given that market forces are changing the health care system in ways
that go far beyond anything we’ve contemplated through public policy intervention. I’ve
proposed that the measure of our success in health care is our ability to improve the health
of our citizens, in a way we can afford. I think the history of the fully integrated prepaid
system demonstrates an unswerving focus on doing just that. 
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There are critical lessons to be drawn from that history about quality care and system
integration, about incentives, insurance, consumer attitudes, and so forth, which will be at
the focal point of our public debate as we look to the marketplace driving us forward over
the next decade. I’ve suggested in passing that we have really just seen the tip of the
iceberg in terms of the transformation in the market forces affecting health care. My belief
is that, contrary to popular opinion, over the next 5 to 7 years the continued push will
actually drive prices down in health care, in most competitive markets, given the excess
supply that exists and the opportunities for performance improvement. We anticipate that
even as the population is converting to a managed care kind of delivery system, there will
be enormous pressures to continue to ratchet costs down. This raises troubling questions
about what the consumer will be getting under those circumstances. I am just as worried
about what happens if you continue an unfettered fee-for-service system that historically
has provided too much care. So I don’t mean to say that what we’ve been doing historically
has been right. But this new system that we’re moving into carries its own dangers. 
Finally, I believe that the experience of organizations like Harvard Community Health
Plan, our own organization, and the others around the country that are organized
according to the principles I have outlined can shed important light on these dilemmas,
and, going forward, can serve as a very critical benchmark about how we can do things in a
way that impacts on the health of the populations in the most affordable way possible.
